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ABSTRACT
I constructed the Metronomad instrument to facilitate my ongoing exploration of the
footstep as a basic epistemological unit. This portable percussive instrument assigns pre-
recorded or sampled sounds from the environment to each foot; each step triggers a
sound, amplified through speakers that are worn as a backpack.
My first performance in the development of this instrument took place at the crosswalk of
77 Massachusetts Avenue, where I performed for several hours during a busy time of
day. For the duration of the performance the crosswalk's audible pedestrian signal
sounded only when I walked. Each note of the "cuckoo" tone was assigned to one of my
feet.
In this way I provided the tone pedestrians rely on for safe passage, altered only in tempo.
As I walked I attempted to match my steps to the pace of another person, thus modulating
the tempo of the crosswalk tone by the pace of that person.
Throughout modernity artists have treated the urban walk as an ideal site for exploration
of new social, political and aesthetic roles. At this seminal site I propose through my
project: a new mimetic epistemology rooted in sound and the body, rather than sight and
the eye; a new spatial interpretation of the modern autonomous individual; and a
confrontation with the politics of the panoptic gaze.
Thesis Supervisor: Joan Jonas
Title: Professor of Visual Arts
----------

"We find the other the same way we find our body."
- Maurice Merleau-Ponty
from The Prose of the World, p. 138

CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction
Artist as Urban Walker
The Rhythm of the Walk
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
The Project
Physical Description
Structural Analysis
The Mimetic Procession
"Ut pictura, ita visio"
Art by Machine
Application
Subjective Knowledge
The Social Procession
Skeptically Free
Romanticism and Rebellion
The Stranger
Application
The Political Procession
Flaneur as Voyeur
Foucault's Panoptic Gaze
de Certeau's Response
Application
The Ritual Procession
Victor Turner's Definition of Ritual
Art in Everyday Life
Conclusion
Bibliography
Illustration Credits
back of contents
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Artist as Urban Walker
Artist as painter of modem life, observer of the city,flaneur in the crowd - throughout
modernity artists have taken to the street, walking and looking. As conceived of and
embodied by Baudelaire, the artist in this role lives out the Enlightened ideal of the free
man, moving through space, led by desire or whim, bound by no other reign of ethic or
state. An anonymous prince of the streets, perhaps thisflaneur even exercises territorial
tendencies to map and claim, to know New Amsterdam or Paris as Vermeer's
cartographic contemporaries knew the old Amsterdam. For thisflaneur, social contact is
forbidden. "C.G." remains anonymous in Baudelaire's essay about the roaming "Painter
of Modem Life," Vito Acconci never touches the Followed, but turns back. What remains
is only the post-ambulatory record of the encounter, a public document for sale in gallery
or newspaper, reporting faithfully on the incident. Artist asflaneur, as prince, as
correspondent. This figure eventually found its most comfortable position behind the
movie camera, making of the audience a collection of solitary witnesses, participating
vicariously, eager to submit to the illusions of the medium.
The roles afforded the walking wanderer in modem life can be contradictory. As a free-
roaming viewer the walker is the embodiment of the Enlightened empirical individual,
dependent on none, free to look and not be seen. This traditionally male figure is also,
however, able to subversively or romantically dissent against modem ways of life. The
wanderer has been the place of both bohemian and aesthete, of rogue and dandy, of
terrorist and scientist. It facilitates both the objective view of the surveyor and the
subjective reflections and desires of the shopper or thief.
If with Marshall Berman we take Marx's manifesto as a model for Modernist art
practiceI, the pursuit of such contradictions may be what attracts the artist to this role in
the first place. In Marx's account of the revolutionary cycles of modern capitalism, the
artist becomes an ambiguously tragic figure who truthfully carries the ideals of a culture
to their bitter end, drunk on the power, the thrill and desire of the act. The artist alone is
able to carry out to the fullest modernity's conflicted desires to hold both the new and the
old, the material and the immaterial, the sacred and the profane. Such a mission, though
seemingly unavoidable, has proved itself destructive to the artist and everyone else time
and again. At the end of his wild-eyed car race through the city, Marinetti winds up
crashed in a ditch. Recent feminist critiques have revealed how those at the other end of
the walker's gaze fare little better.
Artists of the past century have placed themselves in this paradoxical role with all manner
of intentions, hopeful or desperate. I will add my proposition to the lot, a proposition
explored at this seminal site of modernist art practice, the walker on the street. Unlike the
flaneur, I will reveal my presence as an observer, making available an encounter with the
observed. Yet this encounter will not attempt a Utopian community of two; it will retain
isolation and strangeness. The encounter will rely on the function of the artist as mime of
the world, reporting on the marginalia of the streets. Yet my report will be in real time, on
the spot, to others who move through the site of observance. This report will be posed
informationally, but as information that is heard, not seen, and delivered to the ears of
bodies in transit. In the pages to follow, through describing and contextualizing this
project I will provide a more detailed account of the discussion into which I wish to enter;
and I will also introduce what new I have to offer to the conversation.
The Rhythm of the Walk
If the preoccupation of this modern artist/wanderer has traditionally been spatial, my
interests lie in the temporal. Unlike Acconci or the practitioners of Situationist derive, I
study and exercise the urban path not as a trajectory through Cartesian space, but as a
rhythm, a time base, a constant drone of information created by the contact of feet to
earth. Utilized as a measurement of time, the repetition of the footstep provides an ever-
present reference point experienced bodily as well as analytically, unconsciously and
consciously.
Berman, p.102
Unlike Standard Time, a Cartesian abstraction which aspires to be universal, the meter of
walking is anchored in an individual subject, affirmed in the fringes of the body's
consciousness through the constant affirmation of gravity's pull of feet against earth. I
want to accentuate and amplify this meter to allow for full experience of its possibilities
as a liberating and creative measure in everyday life. If part of the function of
universalized, Cartesian time and space is to locate all bodies within a commensurable,
homogeneous medium, I believe it possible to utilize the commensurability of a person's
individual repeated steps each day as a grid for locating oneself within a more personal
and immediate experience of time and space.
In her book The Art of Taking a Walk, Anke Gleber finds in film a natural analog to the
flaneur's experience of the city. In her reading, theflaneur "captures the moving images
of city streets, acting in this way like the camera of silent cinema.. .I argue that the
flaneur, in the process of strolling, sets out to perceive everyday life as a three-
dimensional screen whose images he projects immediately into his unique form of
literature."2 If, as Gleber asserts, "the dream state of flanerie has much in common with
filmic reception and its hypnosis, reverie, and hunger for experience," 3 perhaps the
footstep serves this hypnotic state much as sound serves the illusion of film. Film critic
Michel Chion argues that synched sound serves film not as mere "added value,"
duplicating what is seen, but by creating illusion through an "audiovisual contract." In his
most physical example, Chion examines the punch as a quintessential "synch point"
between sound and image. He writes:
The punch becomes the moment around which the narration's time is constructed: beforehand, it is
thought about, it is announced, it is dreaded; afterward, we feel its shock waves, we confront its
reverberations. It is the audiovisual point toward which everything converges and out of which all
radiates...Sound is the rubber stamp that marks the image with the seal of instantaneity.4
fig. 1 scene from Raging Bull, 198
2 Gleber, p.x
3 ibid
4 Chion, p. 60
Through video and performance artists
have explored synched (and out-of-synch)
percussive sound and image in just this
way, bringing our eyes, ears, and
sympathetic bodies in and out of belief.
The woodblocks of Joan Jonas' Songdelay,
or the spoon in Vertical Roll; the bodily
collisions of Marina Abramovic and Ulay
with each other and with architecture in
their Relation Work series; perhaps even
Chris Burden's Shoot; all isolate the
phenomenon of the shock of impact as a
point on which to hang belief.
In a 1998 article for October, Kathryn
Chiong examines the use of the slam, the
knock, and even the step as common to
the work of Bruce Nauman and Samuel
Beckett, utilized as a kind of basic
existential and epistemological unit. In
her analysis, one knock heard might have
been a branch banging on the window.
A second knock might have been
someone at the door; if the knock
persists, repeating endlessly, "the excess
finally signals its own presence. The
sound, then, not of someone at the
door, but of knock-knock-knock-knock -
and this mechanism of repetition."5
fig. 2 Marina Abramovic and Ulay
Light /Dark, 197
5 Chiong, p.65
Chiong likens Nauman's video Wall-Floor Positions, in which Nauman punctuates a
series of body contortions with the sound of his body slamming against the floor and
wall, to Beckett's play Footfalls, in which the character May paces endlessly a proscribed
path parallel to the stage's "fourth wall." "No, Mother, the motion alone is never
enough," says May, "I must hear the feet, however faint they fall."6 Speaking of Beckett's
play, Chiong writes:
Striking the ground, touching it is not enough. There must be an excess of sense, a
vestige of movement which consists in this pulse, however faint, of pacing. Slightly
different in dynamic, perhaps, from the slam of Wall-Floor Positions, the beat in both is
never metronomic, but the irregular pulse of a body that falters, accelerates, decelerates.
Chiong builds an argument for the use of the body as an instrument of thought in the
work of Nauman and Beckett. Drawing also on the work of philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy,
she concludes, "For Nauman, like Nancy, to think touches on to jump, to crash cymbals,
to scream, to hear. For Nancy, like Beckett, this process (of thought touching its body) is
conceived as a step."8
fig. 3 Bruce Nauman
Wall-Floor Positions, 1968
6 Beckett, p.241
7 Chiong, p.74
8 ibid., p.77
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Chapter 2
THE PROJECT
I set out to explore the temporality of theflaneur's walk by creating an instrument that
would allow me to emphasize the role of the rhythm of the feet in the exploration of the
city. If vision served the firstflaneur-artists as a mode of not only urban exploration but
of social relation, fantasy, and political action, I have been curious to see how an
emphasis on the feet over the eyes might affect these activities, as well.
In my first explorations of this possibility, I utilized live microphones to amplify the
sound of my own feet, drawing the sound in and out of synch with the actions of myself
and others. In one manifestation, I created an apparatus through which I could listen to
the live sounds of my own feet through headphones, delayed by the amount of time it
took for one foot to follow another in a routine pace. This enabled me to walk in time
with a rhythm of my own generation, a rhythm offset just enough to render it an external
beat.
In another application, I amplified the live sound of my steps loudly into a resonant
stairwell. Waiting in the stairwell on the first landing up from the ground floor, I walked
only when someone began ascending the steps below. As this individual began climbing
the staircase I attempted to keep pace with them, providing the illusion of their own steps
amplified. In this way I treated the pace of another person as an epistemological subject
the way aflaneur such as Vito Acconci treated a person's spatial trajectory. Yet it brought
us both in synch with a sound seemingly generated by the stairwell itself, and created a
specific, if paradoxical, social role for myself as an artist and voyeur. I followed even as I
led, always remaining in plain sight one flight above the ascending walker.
At this point I required a medium that would facilitate more intuitive and inventive
explorations of social and technological relations such as these. I decided to create an
instrument which could generate as I walked not only the live sounds of my own feet
walking, but any pre-recorded, synthesized, or sampled sound. This instrument, which
also included a self-contained amplification system, took the form of a backpack. With it
I can assign to each foot a different sound, variable in speed and volume according to
how hard my foot hits the ground; it functions as an electronic percussive instrument. As
a self-contained, worn instrument the backpack facilitates my exploration of the city in a
role I have termed Metronomad.
My explorations with this instrument have barely begun. For my thesis project in the
Visual Studies program at M.I.T., however, I utilized the technology from the backpack
to create a site-specific performance. My role as a performer on this site was one
discovered through the use of the pack, though I did not use the pack itself in the
performance. This performance, perhaps a last work made in preparation for the full
exploration of the Metronomad instrument, serves as the subject for the remainder of this
paper.
I will rely in this description on a structural method of explication usually utilized by
anthropologists in the analysis of ritual. In such an analysis, especially as demonstrated in
the work of Victor Turner, a performance or ritual is described in terms of a processional
structure, in which roles transform and mutate within a transitional or liminal space,
before restoration of normalcy at the conclusion. Later in my paper I will return to the
subject of ritual as a choice of method in this instance, and relate it to the site and
function of the piece.
fig. 4 performance photograph
Physical description
For 5 hours during a busy time of the schoolday I performed an intervention in a
prominent place of passage for the MIT community. The work, sited at the crosswalk in
front of the institution's main entrance at 77 Massachusetts Avenue, involved my
alteration of the audible crosswalk signal provided for the blind. The two-note "cuckoo"
tone of this signal is a distinctive part of everyday life at MIT - no other crosswalk in the
vicinity features such a signal. It is not uncommon at the site to overhear a nearby
pedestrian whistling or singing along with the loud and insistent tone. The sighted as well
as the blind have come to rely on it for safe passage.
For my project I tied the tempo of this tone to my footsteps, assigning through a remote
MIDI system one of the two notes to each shoe. For the duration of the performance I
walked when the tone would normally be provided, crossing to the opposite side of the
street each time the traffic stopped for a red light. In this way the signal system remained
intact and consistent, differing from normal activity only in the tempo of the notes.
Each time the "Walk" sign flashed on, I began walking, modulating my pace to re-create
the signal tone as close to its usual tempo as possible. After a few paces, however, I
altered my gait to match that of one other pedestrian nearby, drawing up close to the
person as I did so. This brought my pace, the pace of the chosen pedestrian, and the
tempo of the crosswalk signal into the same rhythm. When we both reached the sidewalk
again, I turned sharply to the right or left and resumed the pace of the tone's everyday
tempo, walking parallel to the street until the visible "Walk" signal changed to read
"Don't Walk."
I repeated this process each time the traffic stopped for a red light, inserting myself into
the normal operation of the traffic signal system.
fig. 5 performance photograph
Structural analysis
As a performance, the project is best described as a single performance repeated regularly
over the course of a few hours. Each performance undergoes a series of transformations
as a mimetic act, as a social act and as an act of control. Here I will briefly describe here
the structural procession of each performance in terms of how my role changes as a
mimic, as a social being, and as an agent of power.
As an artist working mimetically, I proceed through three stages. Through these I utilize
the audible crosswalk tone as a mimetic medium, manipulating this medium with the
instrument of my body. In the first stage I mimic the tone itself, modulating my pace to
imitate the normal tempo of the audible signal. In the second, I depart from this act to
choose a new mimetic subject; finding a fellow pedestrian, I increase my pace to match it
to that of his or her feet. Once we have reached the sidewalk again, in the third stage I
resume the first mimetic act, ceasing when the visible "Don't Walk" signal indicates that
it is no longer safe to cross.
fig. 6 performance photograph
These mimetic shifts create a second structural procession, in which my social status
shifts through several stages. I begin each performance as an anonymous member of the
crowd, waiting on the curb. As soon as the crowd gets underway, I fall behind, walking
an odd and irregular pace in order to imitate the signal's usual tempo, moving awkwardly
and alone. Upon changing my pace to imitate another person, I move next to the person
and become a member of a pair or trio. By doing so, I resume a position of anonymity
and I am no longer alone. Despite this impression of a social bond or of an offering,
however, I make no full social contact. My eyes remain locked on the person's feet,
keeping the door to interaction closed. Upon reaching the opposite sidewalk my social
status shifts once again, as my temporary partner leaves the site. I am left alone to take up
the pace of the crosswalk signal's everyday tempo, moving against the crowd,
awkwardly. Finally, I stop walking and take up a position as member of the crowd again.
I am another person waiting on the curb, waiting to resume the process.
This procession of social and mimetic roles implies yet a third series of shifts, shifts in
my exercise of power. As my control over the traffic signal becomes apparent, so do my
decisions to submit freedom of movement to various systems and subjects. For example,
when I first leave the curb, I utilize mimesis to perform an act of "trompe l'oreille,"
creating the illusion of normalcy at the site. This conceals the fact that I control the tone,
instead making it appear as if I have submitted my actions to an external regulatory
sound, as might a dancer or a soldier.
fig. 7 performance photograph
I
By altering my pace to match that of another, I publicly assume control of the external
sound. This act of theft disrupts the regular rhythm of the site, and creates doubt in the
urban infrastructure. My first act with this freedom and power, however, is to submit my
movements to those of another walker. Through this act I enforce a structure on my
newfound freedom, submitting it to the task of initiating a social bond, and bending the
tone to be governed by the actions that it usually governs. Though I abandon this act
upon reaching the curb again, my resumption of a pace imitative of the signal's usual tone
carries a new significance. My position as generator of the signal now revealed, my
actions are not regulated by an external signal but by conscious decision. I submit my
freedom and control, as well as my body, to the urban infrastructure, attempting to restore
faith and trust in the signal. I become a provider of safety, an intermediary between the
city and its inhabitants, though my control over the signal is assured.
Having described the structure of the project in terms of mimetic, social, and political
concerns, I will now return to contextualize these analytical descriptions within the
history of how other artists have taken up similar concerns in the past. I will then return
to address the significance of my repetition of these changes as a ritual, before
concluding by situating my actions within the broader context of the work as an
intervention in a traditional site of modernist investigation.
fig. 8 performance
photograph
Chapter 3
THE MIMETIC PROCESSION
Pictorial art as a mimetic activity, fulfilling other than a symbolic, emblematic or
linguistic function, is usually described as a modem invention, birthed during the
Renaissance. As such, it is often spoken of in conjunction with new conceptions of
science, and is thus part of a larger epistemological shift. As my project purports to
perform at least two mimetic acts, I would like to situate these acts in relation to the
epistemological orientations of other mimetic aesthetics since the Renaissance.
As a situational device I will compare the epistemologies of two seemingly unlike
aesthetic strategies, two approaches that have been of particular interest and relevance to
me in my work. Examining the approaches of Dutch art of the 17th Century, and of
conceptualism of the late 1960's and 1970's, I hope to ground my own project as a late
modem event. According to art historian Svetlana Alpers, there are scant theoretical
treatises associated with Dutch art of the 17th century9 ; for my purposes I will rely
largely on her analyses of the artworks themselves. In contrast, the Conceptualists and
their advocates produced an abundance of texts, on which I will draw here. With these
two sets of sources I will attempt to set the stage for a modem mimetic aesthetic, before
describing how my own project functions mimetically and epistemologically.
The two approaches, disparate at first glance, hold a few important characteristics in
common. In both we find a quest for objectivity, de-emphasizing the subjective role of
the artist. In both we see a preoccupation with information and text, which often
manifests itself in a fascination with maps and mapping. Lastly, both retain an interest in
9 Alpers, p.xxii
I
the mechanics of vision, in optics; the Dutch are among the first to explore the camera
obscura, while the Conceptualists push modern photography to its limits as a
conventional recorder of acts and subjects.
"Ut pictura, ita visio"
In her book The Art of Describing, Alpers argues that Dutch art of the 17th Century, the
time of Vermeer, Rembrandt, and Van Ruisdael, is part of a new science based in
"natural knowledge", an empirical approach championed by Francis Bacon. An early
Enlightenment philosophe, Bacon argued for a new science that replaced the canon of
history with the canon of the physical world. The old books closed, the new scientist
could put his tools to work discovering everything anew as it appeared to him, instead of
as it was described to him by religion or tradition. Alpers places Dutch painters of the
time in this context, preoccupied with the recent invention of the lens in Northern Europe,
Kepler's new understanding of the mechanics of the eye, and with the rapidly changing
maps made in Amsterdam from reports of the New World.
Viewed within this context, Dutch art of the time becomes more than a naive depiction of
the world at large. Alpers argues that the picture itself becomes almost incidental, a
record of looking rather than a stage set for viewing. " Ut pictura, ita visio, " Kepler wrote,
which Alpers interprets to mean, "Sight is like a picture."' 0 Looked at in this way, the
straightforward and illusionistic approach of 17th century Dutch painting does not so
much privilege the seen world over subjective interpretation as it does render all viewing
equal; if, as Kepler established, the eye "sees" not the world but a representation of the
world projected through a lens, then everything becomes a representation, and viewing a
painted still life holds little distinction from viewing an actual still life.
This results, according to Alpers, in a conflation of forms. Pictures and maps collide in
the invention of the bird's-eye-view; catalogs and diagrams collide with still-life and
tableaux painting. The foil for this kind of work was pictorial representation as conceived
of by the Italian Renaissance artists, a mathematically conceived and verified spatial
stage on which to portray objects from the world. In Alpers' analysis, the Dutch treated
the picture not so much as an illusionistic window as much as a "surface on which to set
forth or inscribe the world."" Whereas Albertian perspective presupposed a single,
mathematically determined viewpoint for artist and viewer, Dutch painting often
contained no single viewpoint, or even included the viewpoint in the picture.
Alpers finds in Vermeer's work The Art ofPainting a simple summary of the Northern
epistemology of painting. In this work the artist includes himself in the picture,
rejesenting both the viewer and the viewed, even including a meticulously rendered map
10 Alpers, p.3 6
" ibid., p.137
hanging in the background. Of this work, Alpers says, "Observation is not distinguished
from the notation of what is observed."12 What is pictured here is not a subject, but an act
of viewing. What is left behind is only a record.
fig. 9 Jan Vermeer
The Art of Painting
12 ibid., p.168
fig. 10 Mel Bochner
Measurement Room
1969
Art by Machine
If Alpers' subject takes place at the birth of the Enlightenment project, conceptual art is
usually portrayed at modernity's opposite end. Lauded as the death knell of "high"
modernism, conceptualism is usually given credit for fully "dematerializing" the art
object. Of course, art objects made by conceptual artists are plentiful; arranged and
catalogued faithfully in shows and books throughout its history and historicization, these
objects often are portrayed as evidence or documentation of acts, rather than as acts
themselves. Though conceptualists were not typically interested in the specifics of visual
perception, conceptualist work often hold an epistemological position in common with
the Dutch painters. They privileged the act of reading over the text, the process of
perception and cognition over the perceived subject. The conceptual art object, like the
Dutch still-life painting, was often incidental, a record of an act of knowing.
Working out the legacy of Duchamp, conceptualists sought to render the privileged
artistic act as objective and systematic. Duchamp's choices for his readymades held still
too much subjective weight. To this end the conceptual art object, such as Kosuth's Five
Words in Blue Neon, often pointed only to itself, but depended on art's traditional
mimetic function in order to do so. Occasionally it also depended on the standardized
systems of measurement devised by the Enlightenment scientists. Artists such as Mel
Bochner pointed not reflexively to the work, like Kosuth or Nauman, but to the measured
perception of the work.
In his early essay, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, Sol Lewitt wrote that in conceptual art,
"The idea becomes the machine that makes the art."' 3 As in Alpers' conception of Dutch
painting, the art object points back to the artist's act first, before referring to the subject
portrayed. The comparison only holds, however, as far as a conceptual work refers to an
artist's attempt to perceive or represent a subject. This would hold true to many of the
works that deal with measurement, categorization, or those that seek to describe
themselves. Most assuredly, this would hold true for conceptualist use of photography.
Even if painters and sculptors shifted their interest away from depiction under the sway
of modernism, photography could not so easily change. As Jeff Wall writes in his essay
for the recent conceptual art retrospective held at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Los
Angeles, "It is in the physical nature of the medium to depict things." 14
The photograph's nature as a depictive object presented a challenge to conceptual art, if
conceptualism's goal was to fully and tragically carry out modernism's drive to make a
work refer only to itself. According to Wall, artists like Bruce Nauman or Douglas
Huebler wrested photography into this fateful modernist position, paradoxically, through
acts of mimesis, in which the photograph imitates other photographic acts. Wall describes
how this work sought to imitate forms celebrated even by modernism, such as reportage
or amateurism, in order to question the "truth" of what such acts sought to document. By
using the camera to document the staged event while retaining modes of reportage, the
artists turned depiction back on itself the way that formalist painting had turned painted
depiction back on itself. In this "death" of modern art, the works retain their traditional
mimetic function, but simply do not depict other than themselves.
fig. 11 Joseph Kosuth Five Words in Blue Neon, 1965
Application
Dutch acts retain faith in vision, in perception, but still leave the artwork to point to the
act of seeing more than to the seen. Conceptualist acts also point to the act of perception,
but would point to the perception of the artwork, not to the perception of the rest of the
world. Both retain mimesis as a function of art, and both privilege the artist's act over the
13 Lewitt, p. 12
14 Wall, p.247
observed subject or the art object. The making of the art object, the mimetic act, serves as
a means to the end of providing the artist with a structured epistemological encounter.
I have followed this model for my own project, creating a performative act that facilitates
a perceptual exercise. In this instance the audible signal and occasionally my own body
become the mimetic record, but here the record happens only at the moment of
prception, not lingering in the form of photograph or painting. In this way, the project's
frm relates more to the mimetic work in video and performance of Dan Graham than to
that of conceptualist photography or Dutch painting.
I start by concealing my control of the crosswalk signal; by attempting to re-create the
tone's usual tempo I appear to be imitating an external subject. By my faithful act of
reproduction, I create faith in the depicted subject; all seems normal, save for my erratic
motion. At this stage, I am the traditional artist, faithfully reproducing the world,
concealing my role.
By shifting my choice of subject from the signal to the pace of another pedestrian, I
reveal my role and turn the mimetic act to serve my own purposes - an engagement with
another individual. Having sacrificed faith in my first depiction as an aid to safe passage,
the success of my second depiction has new ramifications. If I am successful, I achieve a
visual union between our two bodies, moving in synch to the tempo of the crosswalk
signal. Here my body reads as a picture or a mirror not of the external tone, but of
another's movements.
My return in the third stage to imitate the crosswalk tone reflects a new mimetic role. If
my goal is to restore faith in my illusion, my role is no longer obscured. I have revealed
myself to be the generator of the signal, and ask people to place their trust not in my
faithful depiction, but in my choices to stop and start when safety dictates.
Though my mimetic acts rely on vision, the instrument of depiction is my own body, my
legs. By using my body as an epistemological instrument, I depart from the models
suggested by Alpers, conceptualism, or even Dan Graham. Graham, Vermeer, and
Huebler still rely on language to convey what they record. Though in my project the
traffic signal is the informational medium, my legs convey to myself and others what is
unique about an individual's pace of walking. If everyone on the site experiences the
illusion of my correct reproduction of the crosswalk's everyday tone, only I experience
the specific nature of another person's pace. Through my public appearance alongside the
chosen subject, and through the crosswalk tone, I mount a depiction of an act of
knowledge experienced only by me. By walking in synch with another person I seek to
experience bodily the difference between their pace and my own
Subjective Knowledge
In this way I acknowledge a degree of subjectivity in perception not often referred to by
conceptualism or Alpers' Dutchmen. In Alpers' reading the Dutch made paintings that
pointed to singular perceptual acts, more than to the Italian hope for a more universal,
Platonic ideal of perception. Though the conceptualists rarely demonstrated any faith in
the language on which they relied, they too are preoccupied with empirical description. If
the Dutch carried great hope for such universal "natural" knowledge, the conceptualists
seem damned to it. In a tragic, Beckett-like work, Dan Graham performed his work
Performer/Audience/Mirror limited only to linguistic description of visual perception.
For close to 30 minutes Graham described what he saw of himself and the audience,
observing bodies without using them. His act reveals the absurdity and bondage of an
aspiring universal system of description, but does not propose a new method.
fig. 12 Dan Graham Performer /Audience IMirror, 1977
By placing my body in the epistemological loop, I hope to know the world in terms other
than language and measurement, which aspire to be universal. If in the 17th century
artists found common language in Enlightenment science's new conceptions of "natural
knowledge" and empirical perception, today's science offers art a struggle with scientific
truth after Einstein's theories of relativity. Anticipating phenomenology's rendering of all
perception as trapped in the personal subjective realm, scientists and historians of science
such as Michel Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn sought to include subjectivity and intiuition in
the epistemological act, without destroying the possibility of truth altogether.
Polanyi did this not by proposing a new scientific model, but by looking more closely at
how science and the scientific community already function. There he sought to identify
the "personal co-efficient""5 of even the most rationalistic processes. He brought attention
to the prior decisions made by scientists before they even entered the epistemological
process, the grids through which they perceived and collected data. Rather than decrying
these as subjective and irrelevant, however, Polanyi celebrates them as an essentially
human element at the center of the encounter. Most importantly to my work, he locates
this human element as centered in the body. I will quote at length here two paragraphs
central to this argument:
Our appreciation of the externality of objects lying outside our body, in contrast
to parts of our own body, relies on our subsidiary awareness of processes within our
body. Externality is clearly defined only if we can examine an external object
deliberately, localizing it clearly in space outside. But when I look at something, I rely for
my localization of it in space on a slight difference between the two images thrown on
my retina, on the accommodation of the eyes, on the convergence of their axis and the
effort of muscular contraction controlling eye motion, supplemented by impulses
received from the labyrinth, which vary according to the position of my head in space. Of
all these I become aware only in terms of my localization of the object I'm gazing at; and
in this sense I may be said to be subsidiarily aware of them.
Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes can be regarded now as the act of
making them form a part of our body. The way we use a hammer or a blind man uses his
stick, shows in fact that we shift outwards the points at which we make contact with the
things that we observe as objects outside of ourselves. While we rely on a tool or probe,
these are not handled as external objects.. .they remain necessarily on our side, forming
part of ourselves, the operating persons. We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate
them as part of our own existence. We accept them existentially by dwelling in them. 16
In the central epistemological act of my project, that of walking in the pace of another, I
apply this model to the probing of a human subject, a human body. Through my legs, I
appropriate the pace of another person into my own body. I "dwell" in their rhythm as a
way of making their body an extension of my own (or perhaps the other way around), if
only briefly. A rhythm familiar to the other person defamiliarizes me to my own; the
degree to which I am defamiliarized is revealed in how awkward my movements become
as mime. In this project, I experience the new rhythm just long enough to estrange myself
to my own body, without "learning" the rhythm and losing myself.
Of course, my act is not an abstract scientific investigation; it is a social act. Even Polanyi
carried out his proposals to their full social implications. In his essays compiled in
Science, Faith, and Society he investigates how when a personal subjective element is
acknowledged in scientific investigation, truth becomes socially constructed.
Conceptualists certainly did not ignore this aspect of their work either, and next I will
address the social implications of my project's mimetic procession.
15 Polanyi, p.1 7
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Chapter 4
THE SOCIAL PROCESSION
Skeptically free
In describing his 1969 work Following Piece, Acconci locates the work in the category of
conceptual art, as defined in Sol Lewitt's credo that "the idea becomes the machine that
makes the art." He describes himself in the work as "a kind of dumb copying machine,"' 7
not unlike the Dutch painters who sought to become pure lenses. Importantly, however,
Acconci makes the further observation that "I am almost not an 'I' anymore. I put myself
in the service of this scheme."' 8
This extension of the implications of his role introduces the question of identity; who is
behind the modem empirical eye? A shift in epistemology will necessitate a shift in the
understanding of the individual. Some would emphasize that the individual as a concept
is a modern invention, just as empirical science is a modern invention.
17 Linker, p.20
18 ibid.
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fig. 13 Vito Acconci
Following Piece, 1969
Acconci demonstrates the interrelatedness of these subjects even in his terminology.
Critic Kate Linker points out that in describing Following Piece and other work at the
time, Acconci uses the word "instrument" and "agent" interchangeably to refer to the
artist's role.19 Though both terms are mechanistic in nature, "instrument" connotes a less
active role than "agent," which implies at least some degree of autonomy. Linker points
out that around the same time as Following Piece Acconci began to study the work of
sociologist Erving Goffman, responsible for such influential works as The Presentation of
Self in Everyday Life, 1959, and Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior,
1967.
In these works, Goffman argues that the self is paradoxically out of the individual's
control as well as subject to the individual's choices in the negotiation of social space. At
the core of this work, the self is not stable but socially constructed, shaped by changes in
immediate society. Goffman writes in his book Encounters of how an individual manages
a particular "situated activity," in which he or she is dominated by a single expected role:
'9 ibid.
I have argued that a situated activity system provides an arena for conduct and that in this
arena the individual constantly twists, turns, and squirms, even while allowing himself to
be carried along by the controlling definition of the situation. The image emerges of the
individual is that of a juggler and synthesizer, an accomodator and appeaser, who fulfils
one function while he is apparently engaged in another; he stands guard at the door of the
tent but lets all his friends and relatives crawl in under the flap.
For Goffman, the only power an individual has over the self is in negotiating these
demands through ritualized social encounter. All of the terms used to describe the self s
role in the quoted passage are passive and reactionary - "juggler," "accomodator," and
"appeaser." Acconci embodies this by surrendering his autonomy in the city to others;
even in "public" space Acconci retains no freedom. His only respite is when the Followed
retreats into his or her own private space, leaving Acconci alone again. When alone,
Acconci retains agency and autonomy. When in the company of a chosen stranger,
Acconci surrenders his freedom of movement, even if that stranger is unaware of the
artist's presence. The streets are an analog for the negotiations described by Goffman.
Of course, the composition of the self as described by Goffman thirty years ago sits on
bedrock compared to more recent conceptions in sociology and psychology that question
the existence of the self at all. Contemporaries of Acconci and innumerable artists since
have constructed entire bodies of work around this question. The work of women artists
deserves much of the credit for opening up these possibilities for exploration. For the
purposes of this paper, however, I will limit my discussion to contemporary artists who,
like Acconci, have chosen to address the freedom of the individual through spatial
metaphor. By limiting my examples to artists who have chosen to remain in the tradition
of the flaneur, I hope to situate my project in relation to a continuum similar to that of the
mimetic tradition. There we found Alpers' Dutch painters close to the birth of modem
empiricism, hopeful in its promises, and Conceptualists near to its death, skeptical of the
possibility of the "true" record, if still bound by the same epistemological structure.
Within the continuum of this other modem invention, the autonomous individual, we
might find Acconci, like the Conceptualists, near the end of this notion, skeptical of its
stability, yet retaining its basic structure. Some of Acconci's contemporaries share this
doubt. With no great optimism, Tehching Hsieh and Linda Montano pose their
individuality as symbolically bound performing a year-long project in which they lived
tethered to one another by a length of rope, without touching. They each hold even less
freedom than Acconci, as for them almost any physical move requires some sort of
negotiation. In an earlier work, Hsieh limited his freedom by the self-assigned task of
punching a timeclock every hour for a year. Here his freedom was determined not
socially, but mechanically; his radius of movement was limited to that in which he could
return to the timeclock for the next punch.
20 Goffman, p.40
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At this end of the spectrum we might also find the work of Sophie Calle, who moved
from following people to being followed; for her piece The Detective, Calle asked her
mother to hire a private investigator to follow her at an unspecified time during a
designated week. Calle says of this work, "I was not trying to do weird things, I wanted
to show him what my life was really like, so I just did everything in an intense way."2'
Here the artist moves freely and alone, but always conscious of another's possible
presence as a voyeur. She monitors her own freedom of movement.
Perhaps the anchor of this skeptical end are Samuel Beckett's characters, Vladimir and
Estragon, who in Waitingfor Godot aspire to leave, and cannot. "Nothing to be done,"22
they remain frustrated, isolated in their individuality if occasionally and mercifully
confused about their identity, unable even to communicate successfully with each other.
They sit at the crossroads, but instead of tearing off like a rebellious wanderer, they are
damned to remain in limbo.
fig. 14 Sophie Calle The Detective, 1981
21 Calle, p.32
22 Beckett, Waitingfor Godot, Act I
Romanticism and Rebellion
At the other end of this continuum, where faith in the integrity of the autonomous and
mobile individual remains strong, we find an unlikely cast of romantic rebels. All through
modernity, those who object to modem ways of life have rebelled through living out the
modem ideal of free movement. The Situationists in Paris sought solace from the
restrictions and mechanizations of modem living through the derive, the politicized stroll
in which they sought to exercise their spatial freedom to the fullest. Other contemporary
artists such as Hamish Fulton and Richard Long continue the Transcendentalist tradition
of the solitary country walk, leaving the social spaces of the city behind. Less hopeful
than Thoreau or Emerson, however, these artists leave behind only empirical records of
their trips. Thoreau at least held in common with Baudelaire'sflaneur a belief in the post-
ambulatory composition in verse or prose.
THE NAKED CITY
ILLUSTRATION DE IHYPOTHISE ES POAIES
TOURNANTES EN PSYCNHOEOGRAPHIGUE M L bmia
fig. 15 Guy Debord and Asger Jorn, Psychogeographical map of Paris, 1957
Line 1 55 yards Walked 32 times Total distance I mile
Line 2 55 yards Walked 24 times Total dietance * mile
Line 3 55 yards Walked 16 times Total distance m ile
Line 4 55 yards Walked 8 times Total distance s aile
fig. 16 Richard Long, A 2 1/2 Mile Walk Sculpture, 1969
If Baudelaire's description of the "painter of modern life" as aflaneur first marked out the
role as ideal for the modem artist, he probably owes credit for the role's invention to the
quintessential romantic philosophe, Jean Jacques Rousseau. Toward the end of his life,
exiled to Switzerland, Rousseau penned his last book The Reveries ofa Solitary Walker,
which he poses as a series of meditations composed while walking alone in the country.
"Here am I, then, alone upon the earth, having no brother, or neighbor, or friend, or
society but myself,"2 3 Rousseau begins the work. As the book progresses, we find that
Rousseau is not in fact alone, but lives with his wife, servants, neighbors, and even the
occasional passer-by on the country road. Feigning solitude, however, he engages
himself, in fine empirical fashion, with collecting and cataloging every species of plant in
existence on the little lake island where he resides. Having created and possessed this
picture ("I did not want to leave a blade of grass, a vegetable atom which was not fully
described") to his great pleasure, he is sufficiently prepared to make this declaration:
But if there is a state where the soul finds a position sufficiently solid to repose thereon,
and to gather together all its being, without having need for recalling the past, nor to
climb on into the future; where time counts for nothing, where the present lasts forever,
without marking its duration in any way, and without any trace of succession, without
any other sentiment of privation, neither of enjoyment, of pleasure nor pain, of desire nor
of fear, than this alone of our existence, and which this feeling alone can fill entirely: so
long as this state lasts, he who finds it may be called happy, not with an imperfect
happiness, poor and relative, such as that which one finds in the pleasures of life, but with
a sufficing happiness, perfect and full, which does not leave the soul any void which it
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feels the need of filling. Such is the state in which I found myself often at the island of St.
Peter, in my solitary reveries.. .What is the nature of one's enjoyment in such a situation?
Nothing external to oneself, nothing except oneself and one's own existence; so long as
this state lasts, one suffices to oneself, like God.
Here we have the perfect picture of an Enlightened individual, the modem autonomous
man, who has pictured the world and is now content to disconnect from it. In this
description Rousseau is out of time and out of space, out of society.
As a god unto himself, Rousseau is a happy precursor to more tragic heroes of recent
literature, such as Albert Camus' protagonist in The Stranger. A callous sensualist at the
pinnacle of modem individualism, the Stranger truthfully carries out Rousseau's romantic
ideal to the bitter end, in which as a lawless "god" he kills another stranger without cause.
After this, the sad doubt of Acconci's self-conception as an "instrument" is not so
surprising.
Who is this stranger, the other person ignored or stalked? Within the continuum I have
established, faith or doubt in the freedom and autonomy of the individual artist seems
linked to the fate of this stranger, this "other." Before moving on to locate my
performance in relation to these other explorations of modem individualism, I'll first
introduce a brief discussion of how the stranger has been defined in relation to the
modem notion of the individual.
The Stranger
Early this century, Georg Simmel, a pioneer in the field of sociology, identified the
stranger in spatial terms. In 1908 Simmel wrote:
If wandering, considered as a state of detachment from every given point in space, is the
conceptual opposite of attachment to any given point, then the sociological form of "the
stranger" presents the synthesis, as it were, of both these properties. (This is another
indication that spatial relations not only are determining conditions of relationships
among men, but are also symbolic of those relationships.) 25
In Simmel's description the stranger is a wanderer who has come to stay; his or her
identity as spatially both near and remote suggests to others "the appearance of mobility,"
objectivity, and even freedom 26. For Simmel, what makes the stranger both near and far
is that "with the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in common, whereas
the relation with organically connected persons is based on the similarity of just those
specific traits which differentiate them from the merely universal."2 7 This of course
places more emphasis on what one does not hold in common with a stranger, leading to
the identification of strangers not as individuals, but as a general type of stranger. Here a
24 ibid., p. 1 13
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particular spatial orientation, a condition of mobility temporarily arrested, leads to a
particular social orientation.
In a later essay Simmel addresses more specifically the interrelation of difference,
individuality and freedom. In "Freedom and the Individual" Simmel traces individuality
as it was understood in the 18th century by the revolutionaries of France and America to
a privileging of freedom over all else, a freedom based in a mechanistic concept of nature
that aimed to describe the universal through the particular:
Even if the form of an individual phenomenon is absolutely unrepeatable, it is still a
mere crosspoint and a resolvable constellation of purely universal laws. This is why it is
man in general, universal man, who occupies the center of interest for this period instead
of historically given, particular, and differentiated man. The latter is in principle reduced
to the former; in each individual person, man in general lives as his essence, just as
every piece of matter, peculiar as its configuration may be, exhibits in its essence the
28pervasive laws of matter in general.
The stranger, though a true wanderer, prevents the advancement of freedom by
emphasizing particular differences over the general in common; the stranger is thus less
of an individual. Here the ideal free man is one free from "every restriction and special
determination," more "mankind" than "man," aspiring to an abstraction. Simmel
maintains that this Platonic notion of individualism is the foundation of the modem
understanding of freedom, within which the familiar romantic notion of the individual as
unique from all others is a more recent addition. Writing about this new phenomenon,
Simmel says:
With this development, the modem striving for differentiation is heightened to the point
of repudiating the form it has just won. At the same time, the drive underlying this
development remains one and the same: throughout the modem era, the quest of the
individual is for his self, for a fixed and unambiguous point of reference. He needs such a
fixed point more and more urgently in view of the unprecedented expansion of theoretical
and practical perspectives and the complication of life, and the related fact that he can no
longer find it anywhere outside himself.29
Here we see the modem individual in search of a fixed point, an autonomous center,
whether it be one of peculiar uniqueness or general abstract identity. Goffman's
conception of the self is rooted in this search, even if for him the individual is forced to
keep up a kind of dance between Simmel's fixed points. The constant is a striving after
universality. Rousseau, cut off from the world and exiled, was a still a universe unto
himself, and absolute. Rousseau's less romantic adversaries sought the same state of
universal independence, even if the emphasis was on a unified general autonomy as
"mankind," instead of a localized autonomy as a unique "man."
28 ibid., p.219
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A contemporary analysis of individualism and freedom by Jean Luc Nancy proposes a
similar description, applied to events since Simmel's work, which took place before the
great surges of fascism and communism. In The Inoperative Community, Nancy asserts
that in communism and individualism we find a similar urge - a push towards
immanence, towards absolutist community. Nancy argues that individualism is based on
an atomistic model in which the ideal end is "the absolutely detached-for-itself, taken as
origin and certainty, "0 while the telos of communism is a "an absolute immanence of
man to man."3' Both impossible and undesirable options exclude difference through
destructive elimination or through simple disregard. "The fully realized person of
individualistic or communistic humanism is the dead person,"3 2 he writes.
As a way of evading these deathly ends for all involved, Nancy moves to re-define the
conception of the individual as well as the approach to community. Instead of
individuality Nancy offers singularity, and in place of communion he offers ecstasy33 . In
Nancy's conception, the singular person is defined not by infinite autonomy or immanent
union, by his or her finitude, and thus by the separations between singular persons. The
singular being cannot aspire to autonomy, for the singular person is ontologically
singular. She or he can be no more or less singular, because singularity is qualitative, not
quantitative. Singular beings do not strive for communion, to lose differences toward the
end of unity. Instead they participate most immediately in ecstasy, a temporary surrender
of sovereignty that is not a drive toward fusion; ecstasy requires singularity.
Most importantly, if separation defines singularity, community takes place around the
largest separation - that of the dead from the living. For Nancy a community of singular
beings crystallizes not around a drive toward future immanence and loss of self, but
around the death of its members, "that is to say around the 'loss' (the impossibility) of
their immanence."3 4 Unlike a modem individual,
A singular being does not emerge or rise up against the background of a chaotic,
undifferentiated identity of beings, or against the background of their unitary assumption,
or that of a becoming, or that of a will. A singular being appears, as finitude itself: at the
end (or at the beginning) with the contact of the skin (or the heart) of another singular
being, at the confines of the same singularity that is, as such, always other, always
shared, always exposed. 35
Within this structure, communication exists not in a social bond of recognition, but in a
"sharing of finitude." "In its being, as its very being, singularity is exposed to the
outside," Nancy writes. "By virtue of this position or this primordial structure, it is at
30 Nancy, p.3
31 ibid., p.2
32 ibid., p.13
" ibid., p.6
34ibid., p.14
3 ibid., p.27
once detached, distinguished, and communitarian. 36 When difference is incorporated this
essentially, we are all strangers. Lastly, Nancy relates how for the singular person,
freedom is not expressed through self-sufficiency. "The singular being, because it is
singular, is in the passion - the passivity, the suffering, the excess - of sharing its
singularity. The presence of the other does not constitute a boundary that would limit the
unleashing of 'my' passions: on the contrary, only exposition to the other unleashes my
passions."37
Application
Clearly, at no point in my performance do I exercise a pure and autonomous freedom; I
associate myself instead with Acconci's end of the continuum. But if in Following Piece
Acconci can be seen as searching through Goffman's crowded field for a fixed point of
reference, my path represents something different.
Returning to the reading of my work as a series of short performances, I begin each
performance as a member of the crowd. As a part of a collection of beings who appear to
hold in common only the general characteristic of being at M.I.T., I wait for the traffic
light to change. By Simmel's definition, we are strangers to each other; our mobility is
temporarily arrested, and our perceived differences are likely greater than the abstract
qualities we hold in common.
When the light changes, we resume mobility, but I reveal myself to be bound at least in
my manner of movement to the external environment. My "fixed point" appears to be the
signal itself; before I have revealed my control of the signal, I appear to be bound to its
tempo.
At this point, I speed up to match my pace to that of another person, thus taking control
of that which controlled me. For a brief moment, I have become my own fixed point,
even more in control than my walking companions. I am more Rousseau than Acconci,
more Situationist than soldier. I hold to this position for no time at all, however, for I
reveal my position of control only as a way of attaching myself to another person.
This is the point where Acconci's work began. Like Acconci, I bind my freedom to the
movements of a stranger. Unlike Acconci, I assume a public appearance of union with the
Followed, walking right next to the person as if we were a pair. By joining this person in
the crowd, and walking his or her pace, I appear to be closing the gap of strangeness,
upsetting Simmel's balance of near and far by emphasizing the near. But this is not a
move toward fusion, toward immanence; I make no eye contact with the person, evading
the kind of encounter Goffman described. Perhaps the person does not even see me there.
We reach the sidewalk and part ways. In the end my actions to close the gap reveal ever
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more clearly our differences, through my social invisibility to them and through the
awkward movement required of me to match their pace.
When the Followed entered what Acconci decided to be public space, the artist faced a
choice. Either he could turn back, and resume a state of isolated individualism, or follow
the person into private space. Within the terms of his engagement, their trajectories must
either diverge or converge; such a convergence in private space would suggest their
immanent union as lovers, or more threateningly, as psychotic and victim. These are the
ends of individualism as suggested by Nancy, which both end in death.
When my Followed or imitated subject reaches the sidewalk, I also face a choice. I may
also continue walking with the person, or turn back. Within my terms of engagement,
however, I can move no closer. As my actions are tied to the other's temporally before
they are tied spatially, I have already reached the furthest point of convergence. If I
continue with the person I will simply continue to copy his or her pace; the only
conceivable change would be if the subject ceased walking. This would leave us both
arrested, but no closer or farther from each other.
Given this possibility, I turn back to resume walking in the tempo of the signal's usual
tone. This act returns me to a state of willful individualism; like Acconci, I resume my
status as modern individual. He is once again in control of his own trajectory, I of my
pace and of an aspect of the urban infrastructure. I however, submit my freedom to a
civic duty. I move to facilitate the continued passing of others through this public space,
and then resume my position on the sidewalk to wait for the next "Walk" signal,
beginning where I started. By remaining on this site of transition, I make it a place for
myself, a fixed point of identity; during the performance I have no destination. In this
way, by Simmel's definition I am the one who is not a stranger, the one whose home is in
this place of transition. My duty becomes one of facilitating and approaching the
strangeness of others without seeking to erase the distinction.
Within my described continuum of faith in the modern individual, I would describe my
role in this performance as a procession from skeptical autonomy to skeptical autonomy,
passing through a brief respite not of immanence or communion, but in Nancy's terms, of
singularity aspiring toward ecstasy. I begin and end alone, seeking to at least submit my
individual freedom to a public service. In the middle, I achieve brief community in
Nancy's sense, in that I expose myself and emphasize singularity and difference through
passive submission of my "fixed point" of reference to another singular being, instead of
to the whole abstract public.
As I described in the last chapter, this central activity is one of personal investigation, in
which I seek to hold a physical experience in common with another. Merleau-Ponty
followed modern empirical models of perception to their bitter end in phenomenology,
where he found no possibility for assurance of existence of anything beyond "pure"
perception. Damned to the position Rousseau longed for, Merleau-Ponty still struggled to
understand how he could at least be assured of the existence of another person in the
world, another island. In his essay "Dialogue and the Perception of the Other," he
describes an instance of such assurance:
I am watching this man who is motionless in sleep and suddenly he wakes. He opens his
eyes. He makes a move for his hat, which has fallen beside him, and picks it up to protect
himself from the sun. What finally convinces me that my sun is the same as his, that he
sees and feels as I do, and that after all there are two of us perceiving the world, is
precisely that which, at first prevented me from conceiving the other - namely, that his
body belongs among my objects, that it is one of them, that it appears in my world...38
...This means that there would not be others or other minds for me, if I did not have a
body and if they had no body through which they slip into my field, multiplying it from
within, and seeming to me prey to the same world, oriented to the same world as I.39
Here Merleau-Ponty finds some rescue in common physical experience from the fate of
modem individualism and empiricism - he at least holds in common the shocking impact
of opening one's eyes to the same harsh sun. Here I would add the phenomenon of the
body's rhythmic impact with the hard surface of the earth, arresting our fall with each
step. Connecting heard and felt impact, the experience affirms me repeatedly, soothingly-
"...now.. .now... now... now...now...
In the central part of this performance, like Merleau-Ponty I seek to use this experience to
assure myself of the existence of the other, the stranger. If in Kathryn Chiong's reading of
Beckett and Nauman, the repeated insistence of "...knock-knock-knock-knock-knock-
knock..." signifies presence, perhaps two knocking simultaneously signifies presence in
common, even company. And of course, Nancy's conception of ecstasy, rather than
communion, between singular beings might necessarily conclude in sexual ecstasy, a
meeting and perhaps a temporary synchronization of rhythms.
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Chapter 5
THE POLITICAL PROCESSION
In chapter three I addressed the urban walker as an epistemological being, and in the last
chapter I addressed the role as a social being. I must lastly discuss the role of theflaneur
as a political being, before I conclude by addressing the possibilities of utilizing this
activity as a ritualistic as well as aesthetic act.
Flaneur as Voyeur
If Baudelaire is the original appropriator of this role as one fit for the modem artist, his
text certainly highlights the early nature of this position as one of power. In The Painter
ofModern Life, the essay where he first advocated the position of artist as "man of the
crowd," we find Baudelaire singing the praises of an anonymous artist known as
"Monsieur G." The author praises the artist as "the perfect flaneur," and "the passionate
spectator,"41 who like the hero of Edgar Allen Poe's story The Man of the Crowd throws
41 Baudelaire, p.9
himself into the throngs of anonymous citizens. As a maker of pictures, however, this
flaneur is no mere pedestrian. Among his many praises, Baudelaire writes of the man:
The spectator is aprince who everywhere rejoices in his incognito. The lover of life
makes the whole world his family, just like the lover of the fair sex who builds up his
family from all the beautiful women that he has ever found, or that are - or are not - to be
found; or the lover of pictures who lives in a magical society of dreams painted on
canvas.
This artist is somewhat of a collector, an objective, if romantic ideal that surveys the
world before him in the interest of capturing and taking possession of something.
Baudelaire asserts that what the artist chiefly seeks to capture is not mere pleasure. "He is
looking for that quality which you must allow me to call 'modernity'," writes Baudelaire,
"He makes it his business to extract from fashion whatever element it may contain of
poetry within history, to distil the eternal from the transitory." 43 If we rely on Baudelaire's
description of the artist's works (or if we examine the actual works of the artist,
Constantin Guys), we find that Monsieur G. pictures fashion chiefly in this search for the
ephemeral in the eternal. His pictures resemble the photograph as reportage, candid
scenes of everyday life, usually of those of higher social station, where the details
conveyed focus on dress and posture. Baudelaire uses the occasion of this subject matter
to spend much of his essay in praise of fashion, in particular when demonstrated by
women.
From his position as vicariousflaneur, participating in the artist's experience of the
crowd, Baudelaire exercises the power of a prince. He speaks not of singular women in
the artist's many pictures, but of Woman, generalizing "them" into a "her."4 4 Like
Simmel's stranger, Baudelaire's "Woman" is both near and far, near in her sharing of the
same space of the street, but far in that she holds only the most general characteristics in
common with Baudelaire. "She is a kind of idol, stupid perhaps, but dazzling and
bewitching, who holds wills and destinies suspended on her glance,"4 5 he writes. Also
like Simmel's stranger, from her generalized position she is not allowed the status of
individual.
The politicizing gaze of Baudelaire has been elaborated and critiqued thoroughly in these
terms, as the feminist critique of the "male gaze" is by now canonical in modernism
studies. For the purposes of this essay, my interests stay at a broader level. It is apparent
from the essay that part of Baudelaire's conception of the mission of the modern artist as
"man of the crowd" orflaneur involves a vision that empowers and protects the viewer
through organizing and categorizing the world, even at the expense of the viewed. As a
42 ibid.
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44ibid., p.30
4 ibid.
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participant in the tradition of artist-as-urban-walker, part of my job is to position the
nature of my vision in relation to that of Baudelaire's seminal figure.
In defense of Baudelaire, some have argued that his model is a defensive mechanism,
built to protect himself from the shocks of modem life during a tumultuous time for Paris.
In readings by Walter Benjamin and later by Marshall Berman46, we find the writer
situated in the midst of Haussmann's reconstruction of Paris. Unseemly neighborhoods
have been pushed out of the city to make way for new, wide boulevards, which re-create
city life. This life is one of physical danger, of abundant visual stimuli, of easy incognito,
and above all, of shock. Berman finds intentional irony in Baudelaire's choice of painter
for his essay; among the many he could have chosen, he chose the one whose vision of
modem life did not include the likes of Baudelaire, a melancholy social outcast. In this
light the poet's praises of the modem and the new acquire a tragic air. Like Marinetti in
his Futurist Manifesto, Baudelaire is simultaneously charged and terrified by
modernization.
Regardless of his hopes and fears, however, the poet occupies a position of power at least
as a man, and surely as aflaneur who hides while he watches the changing crowds. The
central appeal of his essay, one for the artist's faithful reproduction of modern ephemera,
cannot be left as politically neutral. His understanding of this activity lies in an appeal to
empirical, pictorial truth, over and against the traditions of the salon that would clothe
contemporary subjects in ancient clothing. "The great failing of M.Ingres," he writes,
referring to the painter, "is that he seeks to impose upon every type of sitter a more or less
complete, by which I mean a more or less despotic, form of perfection, borrowed from
the repertory of classical ideas."4 7 He praises instead the attention to detail of brow and
button demonstrated by Monsieur G., his hero.
Here we find a familiar appeal, an appeal to the validity of observation over tradition
demonstrated by earlier Enlightenment philosophes such as Francis Bacon, and by
Alpers' reading of 17th century Dutch painting. Baudelaire's appeal also points forward to
the understanding of photographic reportage as truth, a tradition the conceptualists later
took up as a problem for modernism. We have established that in its conception the
empirical eye belongs in the head of an objective and free individual. How then does this
individual exercise his or her freedom toward others?
Foucault's Panoptic Gaze
In Foucault's analysis, the masquerade of objectivity and fairness on the part of such a
perspective is a specific political stance. In The Order of Things he first articulates the
political function of the empirical impulse to objectively categorize, classify, and
represent. Later he finds the visual aspect of this aspiration epitomized in the 18th
46 Benjamin, p.163, and Berman, p.150
47 Baudelaire, p.13
century penal invention of the Panopticon, which hides the identity of the viewer but
maintains constant surveillance of the viewed.48 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
articulates how the Panopticon prison is a perfect realization of a model of surveillance
already employed in other areas of modem society. Like Baudelaire's streets, authority in
this model relies on vision, even losing the body in the process:
...the external power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and,
the more it approaches this limit, the more constant, profound and permanent are its
effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is
always decided in advance.49
Writing about Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin had already emphasized the new "protective
function" of the eye in the modern city50 , exploring its incorporations into new spaces in
public life. Finding the structure of the Panopticon in use all over society, Foucault can
now carry Benjamin's analysis out to make this broad statement:
Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one
invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the
meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the
supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines
the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated,
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated
in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies.
As an anonymous observer who makes his presence known after the fact through
reportage, the flaneur-artist plays an important part in the development of such a culture.
The birth of the artist-flaneur initiates the presence of an observer even where there is
none, as in the Panopticon. This role as part of a binding and regulatory mechanism must
be carefully negotiated by the contemporary artist-flaneur who seeks to be critical and
not merely complicit.
Foucault's model laid the groundwork, however, for later work that revealed this system
of surveillance to be less than perfectly executed. If the position of power in a
Foucaultian view of the city provides a bird's-eye-view, (a view attributed to the stranger
by Simmel, incidentally52) Michel de Certeau articulates the creativity that takes place
down below, subversively, and often in plain sight.5 3 de Certeau reads lumbering stability
in the strategic deployment of a Foucaultian surveillance mechanism. By contrast, the
"weak" are able to keep moving, tactically out-maneuvering the strategies of the
48 Faucault, p.200
4 ibid., p.203
5 Benjamin, p.191
5 Foucault, p.217
52 Simmel, p.146
5 de Certeau, p.93
powerful. If spatial orientation is key to panoptic advantage, the "weaker" observed use
temporal orientation to their advantage:54
Dwelling, moving about, speaking, reading, shopping, and cooking are activities that
seem to correspond to the characteristics of tactical ruses and surprises: clever tricks of
the "weak" within the order established by the "strong," an art of putting one over on the
adversary on his own turf, hunter's tricks, maneuverable, polymorph mobilities, jubilant,
poetic, and warlike discoveries."
The central metaphor for de Certeau in his exploration of the creativity of viewed
subjects is the walker. In The Practice of Everyday Life, de Certeau articulates a theory of
tactical maneuvers practiced by the subjects who Foucault supposed to be absolutely
bound by modern urban spaces of surveillance. "Urban life increasingly permits the re-
emergence of the element that the urbanistic project excluded,"56 he writes in his chapter
on "Walking in the City." The creative procedures of these subjects "elude discipline
without being outside the field in which it is exercised,"5 7 and write new histories into the
regulated cityscape through the creation of story.58
fig. 17 Interior of the penitentiary at Statesville, U.S.
1 ibid,. pp.36-38
5 ibid., p.40
56 ibid., p.95
5 ibid., p.96
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Application
de Certeau's analysis helps clarify the role of those artists who have taken up the position
of viewed subject, rather than viewer. Adrian Piper's Catalysis series, in which she went
about her routine life in New York dressed in various stigmatizing guises, or Sophie
Calle's work as the followed in The Detective (she also worked as a stripper for a time)
are examples of this carried out in spatial terms. Many more artists have dealt with this
strategy within the broader discussion of representation.
In my performance, I remain in the position of observer, and fulfill this position much as
it was conceived of by Baudelaire, Foucault, and de Certeau. My position as a white male
certainly qualifies me for the traditional conception of the position. I also fulfill the
regulatory panoptic function of the position quite literally, as I have taken control of a
fig. 18 Adrian Piper
Catalysis IV
1970-71
device that regulates movement through the site. As in de Certeau's definition of the
strategic position of power, I have anchored myself to a specific place, a place in which
most everyone else continues to move as walkers.
The procession of my roles within this broad position, however, is more ambiguous. I
begin as the flaneur begins, incognito, waiting on the curb, a free and autonomous
individual. From there however, I secretly initiate the movements of others through my
first steps on from the sidewalk, which trigger the crosswalk tones. Like theflaneur, I
hold a secret. More powerful than most in such a position, however, I can do more than
fantasize about controlling others in the space. Though others do not depend on my
actions for movement, my movements can initiate the movements of others. I usually am
the first walker on the street, leading the rest by a step.
fig. 19 performance
photograph
In the performance, my departure from imitating the rhythm of the crosswalk signal to
pursuing another person is a contradictory move. This identification and pursuit of a
single person in the crowd is a quintessential act offlanerie. At the same time, however,
it exposes my role as an agent of power, even creating of my activity a spectacle. This is
the last thing either aflaneur or a panoptic agent would want. In another move of
submission, by moving up next to the imitated person I make my position known to them,
as well. Lastly, my move to again take up the rhythm of the crosswalk tone is the most
submissive move of all, as now I have revealed my control of the tone and yet choose to
remain at the site, bound by civic obligation. If the performance primarily serves to
facilitate my experience of walking in synch with another, like Baudelaire'sflaneur who
"enters as he likes into each man's personality,"59 it also serves to expose this act as a
privileged one. At the beginning and the end of each short performance, I submit this
power to civic and mimetic duty. The central act of following also functions mimetically,
but serves my purposes at the expense of those around me.
In the end, my role has very little freedom in this work, perhaps too little to be considered
as having submitted privilege. The almost ascetic nature of the act interests me, however,
as territory for future exploration. By submitting the power that I take (or that is given
me), I am able to explore a role that some would avoid as too historically destructive. Of
even more interest to me, by my acts I am able to emphasize the power of the viewed. In
the systems I set up such as this one, the subject is always faster on the feet than I, and de
Certeau is proved correct in his analysis.
59Tester, p.4
Chapter 6
THE RITUAL PROCESSION
My dependence on a processional structure for the analysis of this work is in part a
reflection of the systematic nature of the piece. It also reflects, however, my hopes for
how such a project might function in terms of ritual, especially as explored in the work of
anthropologist Victor Turner.
Through a lifetime of work in hard field research as well as interdisciplinary analysis and
theory, Turner championed an analysis of ritual as "social drama," in which participants
perform specific roles through a structured sequence or story of events. As rites of
passage, these rituals serve diverse functions, such as elevation of status or reversal of
status, and as social dramas may take place in the form of time-honored ceremony or of
improvised crisis management. Common to all such dramatic forms, Turner asserts, is a
procession through fouryhases: "breach, crisis, redress, and either reintegration or
recognition of schism."6
60 Turner (1982), p.69
In this narrative structure, an initial breach in a community's normal political and social
structure brings about a crisis which threatens the functioning of everyday life. Through
ritualized legal or religious redress an attempt at restoration is made; this stage may
continue through multiple efforts until either a final reintegration of order occurs or a
recognition ofschism acknowledges change and reinstates order under a new
organization. This drama may be enacted on a grand historical scale or for the duration of
a short evening's entertainment, as in a Shakespearean tragedy.
In the case of a rite of passage, Turner follows his predecessor Arnold Van Gennep, who
analyzed specific roles in such a drama in terms of a second sub-process. In this process,
an individual moves from separation through transition, before returning to stability in
the reincorporation phase.61 In the reincorporation phase, individuals may be established
in a new enhanced status, or may be simply returned to normalcy, though ritually
prepared for some aspect of life.
Turner's main contribution to Van Gennep's analysis has been an articulation of the
central phase of transition, which Turner has described often in spatial terms, as a liminal
or transitional space. "Liminality," writes Turner, "is a temporal interface whose
properties partially invert those of the already consolidated order which constitutes any
specific cultural 'cosmos.",62 In this state, existing social, political, and even linguistic
orders are made plastic for play and experimentation, usually inverting existing
hierarchies. The novice is made a king, the king insulted by his subjects. For Turner this
state is by definition impossible to maintain, requiring the bounds of ritualized definition
within which to disrupt and play.
In applying this analysis to art's function in society, Turner reminds us of the classical
understanding of art (especially drama) as a mirror.63 Turner's articulation of what
happens in the transitional liminal stages of ritual enacts this function literally, providing
a reversed or reflexive picture of society for a time. This state Turner terms a condition
not of dissolved structure or anarchy, but of anti-structure, which facilitates community
differently without destroying it. The unique form of community, or communitas, that
occurs in a liminal space, "preserves individual distinctiveness - it is neither regression to
infancy, nor is it emotional, nor is it 'merging' in fantasy."64 Avoiding the kind of
immanent communion that Jean-Luc Nancy sees as ending in death, Turner's communitas
preserves singularity while providing rich opportunity for free play within new and
ambiguous roles.
61 ibid., p.24, 25
62 ibid., p.41
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Responding to the work of Erving Goffman, Vito Acconci addressed the construction of
the self as a multiplicity of roles, determined socially and spatially. Allan Kaprow, also
inspired by Goffman, made more sweeping gestures to build a whole aesthetic
philosophy out of the performance of everyday life in various roles. "Intentionally
performing everyday life is bound to create some curious kinds of awareness, "65 wrote
Kaprow, hoping to inspire through "performing life" a restorative self-consciousness and
alienation from everyday routine. In its most extreme application, for Kaprow the
boundaries between art and life fall away, producing a utopian state of freedom and
"flow" that in Turner's world is impossible to maintain. For Acconci and other early
performance artists, the determination of duration in a piece acquires significance as an
exploration of suspended social normalcy in a liminal state.
Like Kaprow, part of my objective in installing myself systematically in routine spaces,
as in this performance, is to bring the possibilities of Turner's concept of ritual into
situations and spaces made routine through repetition. Unlike Kaprow, I hope for
temporary transformations or reversals that allow for play and experimentation in only a
limited space and time, the way Nancy hopes not for immanent communion and fusion of
individuals but only for brief experiences of ecstasy by singular beings. In Turner's terms,
I seek to create rites of passage which result not in elevation of status, but in restoration
of status after temporary suspension and play. Turner identifies this latter sort of rite as
typically calendrical, repeated and made almost routine. For this reason I am drawn to
transitional spaces of the daily commute, such as street, lobby, stairwell or hallway.
Though perhaps my choice of scenario for this performance was so limited as to allow for
very little play for experimentation, the performance did manifest several of Turner's
characteristics of ritual. Chiefly, at the center of my performance is a liminal inversion of
a traditional structure of power, in which the flaneur is made a spectacle through his act
of stalking. This revelation of secret desires makes possible for me the experience of a
brief and cautious form of communitas between myself and one other person, a
relationship that has as its end not communion but maintenance of singularity and
strangeness. The procession of my role as crossing guard also enacts (though perhaps as a
mere sketch, and not a full-blown play) the story of a Turner-ian social drama, in which
an intial breach in the urban infrastructure creates a crisis of faith in the system,
temporarily redressed by my re-assignment of the regular tempo of the crosswalk signal
to a new pace, before a final reintegration of myself into the system in the last phase,
restoring normalcy.
Turner's vision for the end of such a ritual, in which all is restored to its former place, is
humble, though the place he gives such ritual in society is pivotal. He locates the radical
anti-structure of liminal space as "a time and place lodged between all times and spaces
defined and governed in any specific biocultural ecosystem by the rules of law, politics
65 Kaprow, p.18 7
and religion, and by economic necessity."66 This description places liminality pretty
much everywhere. Even though each liminal transition may give way again to order
restored (even unjust order), however, Turner sees in such transitions fertile ground for
change:
New meanings and symbols may be introduced - or new ways of portraying or
embellishing old models for living, and so of renewing interest in them. Ritual liminality,
therefore, contains the potentiality for cultural innovation, as well as the means of
effecting structural transformations within a relatively stable sociocultural system. For
many transformations are, of course, within the limits of social structure, and have to do
with its internal adjustments and external adaptations to environmental changes.
Cognitive structuralism can cope best with such relatively cyclical and repetitive
societies.67
In my enactments of new rituals in routine spaces, I hope to engender just such an
atmosphere of epistemological, social and political creativity from within, rather than a
broader revolution of dramatic, anarchic destruction and rebirth. This is where I depart
from modernism, as I will explain in my conclusion.
66 Turner (1982), p. 83
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
In describing his hopes for ritual's transformative power, Turner separates himself from
more dualistic conceptions of cultural change. Shortly before the passage I last quoted,
Turner writes:
For ritual, as I have said, does not portray a dualistic, almost Manichean, struggle
between order and void, cosmos and chaos, formed and indeterminate, with the former
always triumphing in the end. Rather it is a transformative self-immolation of order as
presently constituted, even sometimes a voluntary sparagmos or self-dismemberment of
order, in the subjunctive depths of liminality...Only in this way, through destruction and
reconstruction, that is, transformation, may an authentic reordering come about. Actuality
takes the sacrificial plunge into possibility and emerges as a different kind of actuality.
We are not here in the presence of two like but opposed forces as in Manichean myth;
rather there is a qualitative incongruence between the contraries engaged...68
Turner's vision of progress through cycles of destruction and reconstruction holds a great
deal in common with another, more influential vision of this process - that of Karl Marx.
68 Turner (1982), p.8 3
Political theorist Marshall Berman reads in Marx's manifesto a quintessential modernist
vision, in which through increasing the pace of the cycles of revolution already begun by
bourgeois capitalism, society might reach a final revolution, realizing in full the
Enlightened ideal of freedom. For Berman, this passage from The Communist Manifesto
captures Marx's vision:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions,
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices
and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can
ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last
69compelled to face his real conditions of life, and his mutual relations with sober eye.
Berman identifies a paradox in this passage, in that Marx simultaneously laments this
condition as the inhuman result of bourgeois culture, while also celebrating it as the only
way to the final revolution. "Thus he hopes to heal the wounds of modernity through a
deeper and fuller modernity," 70 writes Berman. In his book All That Is Solid Melts Into
Air, Berman claims The Communist Manifesto as "the first great modernist work of art,"7'
and ties the inner contradictions of Marxism, and thus modernity, to the paradoxes
inherent in Baudelaire's vision in Painter ofModern Life.
As illustrated previously, Baudelaire appears to be obsessed with capturing what is new,
current, and modern, even as he stands a great deal to lose as a peripheral figure in the
wave of progress. If as Benjamin and Berman assert, Baudelaire accepts this paradox and
reacts to it through an aesthetic of irony, he holds in common with Marx a kind of tragic
resignation found throughout modernist literature, through Camus, Beckett, and the poet
Vito Acconci.
Marx and Baudelaire also hold in common with much of modernism a common spiritual
vision. As Berman helps to illuminate , in Marx we find a preoccupation with spiritual
polarity - the solid and the melting, the "real" and the illusory, the sacred and the profane.
Concurrently, Baudelaire presents in his essay a central vision of modernity as both
ephemeral and eternal, contingent and immutable.73 Within this polemic they each also
lament the "loss of a halo" in modern life. As Berman writes, "for both men, one of the
crucial experiences endemic to modem life, and one of the central themes for modern art
and thought, is desanctification."74 Berman is one of many to have observed this as a
central theme of modernism.75
69 Marx, as quoted by Berman, p.95
70 Berman, p.98
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72 ibid., chapter 11.1. "The Melting Vision and its Dialectic", p.90
73 Baudelaire, p.12
7 Berman, p.157
7 for an in depth exploration, see the essays included in the catalog The Spiritual in Abstract Art: Abstract
Painting 1890-1985. Maurice Tuchman, editor. Abbeville Press, New York, 1985.
This is where Turner departs from Marx's vision. Though he is interested with Marx and
Baudelaire in the cycles of regeneration and transformation possible in modem life, he
argues in the passage above against reading ritual as a gnostic battle between cosmos and
chaos, opposed but equal. In his picture the struggle is unequal, between an established
order, just or unjust, and legislated windows of chaos. Unlike Marx, Turner's vision has
abandoned modernism altogether, forgetting utopia. Like Jean-Luc Nancy, who wrote his
essay as a response to the failure of communism 76, Turner perhaps foresees the
destructive end of the modernist vision, despite its noble hopes.
Like most modernist heroes, Baudelaire'sflaneur holds a conflicted position. He is the
inverse of Georg Simmel's stranger77 , having come to stay where everyone else is in
transit. Like Turner, I chose to admit inequality and expose the limitations and
contradictions of this role, rather than swallowing the futility of the situation protected by
irony or utopian dementia. Perhaps my initial performance falls short of illuminating the
creative possibilities of this position. If so, may the aspirations I have outlined here be the
standard of success for my future efforts.
7 6 Nancy, p.1
77 Tester, p.6
fig. 20 performance photograph
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